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The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) was once the capital of a
vast empire of terror; a place where surveillance, persecution, and
extermination became merely a quotidian, bureaucratic function
and where the Schreibtischtäter could implement their deadly
ideology from afar, or sometimes in person; a place where
divisions of the SS less associated by the general public with Nazi
crimes against humanity, such as the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and
Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo), would persecute and kill more people
than the Gestapo and most other Nazi institutions of terror. The
RSHA and its many offices became an outlet for many Nazi
intellectual elites, who were educated at the prestigious institutions
of Weimar and Nazi Germany. After the creation of the RSHA
within the SS, these individuals through this apparatus and the
opportunities presented by German military conquests were
transformed from ideological academics to calculating
exterminators of millions. Some made the transition behind a desk
in Berlin, while others were committed to seeing the fruits of their
labor first hand. These were the ‘true believers’ and most devoted
followers of National Socialism.
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Introduction
In the center of modern-day Berlin, long buried under portions of the Berlin Wall on
Prinz Albrecht Straße, rests the foundation blocks of a once massive and imposing building,
which once housed the office of the Reichsicherheitshauptampt (Reich Main Security Office).
Today, the foundations are fully excavated and are on permanent display as part of the exhibition
Die Topographie des Terrors. The exhibit centers on the roles the departments and key
individuals of the RSHA played in perpetrating the Holocaust. Nazi institutions such as the
RSHA, the SD, and SiPo, and even the Einsatzgruppen are not often associated with the crimes
of the Third Reich by the general public, while the SS, SA and Gestapo are generally well
known. 1 Even in academia, the RSHA often escapes notice, not being presented as the nexus of
Nazi terror and perpetration. Individuals like Adolf Eichmann, Reinhard Heydrich, Heinrich
Himmler, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Goebbels and the SS as an institution take center stage in the
historiography of Nazi perpetrators, but Nazi crimes are bigger than the few, big leaders of the
National Socialist regime and more complex than a single umbrella organization.
In his analysis of the SS Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf (The Order under the Death’shead), historian Heinz Höhne mentions the RSHA frequently, but always pushes it to the
background and does not appreciate its central role, referring to it as a ‘shadow organization’
performing menial, bureaucratic tasks. 2 To quickly achieve a concerted effort as immense as the
Holocaust on the state and party level required an immense bureaucracy to manage the logistics
of extermination on an industrial scale. By 1944, some three-thousand individuals were
employed by the RSHA and every member, whether merely alphabetizing unsorted files,

1
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compiling reports from SD informants, or even calculating the logistics of transporting hundreds
of thousands of people in a few days, contributed on some level to the Holocaust. 3
A comparison one may make to conceptualize the RSHA is with the bureaucracy
depicted in the dystopian film Brazil, in which the task of every technocrat within the massive
bureaucratic workforce was so specific and convoluted that no one person could comprehend
how his or her role contributed to the master plan. However, such a depiction could only be
partly true if applied to perhaps the lowest rungs of the bureaucratic ladder, but certainly not to
those on the middle or upper levels. The men of the RSHA knew to what common purpose they
were working and devoted their careers to its completion. 4 They were not ardent, anti-Semitic
thugs as found in the SA, but the intellectual elite of German academia. All were university
graduates and many had doctorates in history, political science, law, or medicine. Born primarily
between 1900 and 1910, they were too young to have fought in the first World War, but became
supporters of völkisch groups in their hometowns and universities in the 1920s and saw the
Machtergreifung of 1933 as an opportunity to put into practice not only what they believed, but
what they ‘knew’ as fact. 5
Joining the SD throughout the 1930s, they perfected their rationale for supporting the
racial state and justified the need for racial purity, but the RSHA converted theory into practice.
The leadership of the RSHA was largely comprised of men of the same generation, experiences
and education, which reared them to form the intellectual backbone of the Nazi regime. 6
However, only through the creation of the RSHA and its ability to focus their efforts did these
3
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men transform from mere racial theorists, academics, spies, and lawyers to the architects of
extermination and mass murder; the true believers and practitioners of Nazi ideology.
Historiography
Historians of the SS
Secondary sources focusing on the RSHA or individual leaders other than the big four
(Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and Göring) have been non-existent until the last decade. On the
other hand, the historiography on the SS as a whole is very rich and has been so since the
immediate post-war years. One of the forerunners in SS historiography was British historian
Gerhard Reitlinger, who published his book The SS: Alibi of a Nation in 1957. Writing a mere
decade after the end of the war, while prosecution of Nazi criminals was largely slowing down in
West Germany, Reitlinger presented an argument that reflected his historical environment. As
part of his title Alibi of a Nation suggests, Reitlinger claimed that the SS became a convenient
excuse for the German nation; only a small group of Nazi zealots were held responsible for war
crimes and the German nation as a whole presented itself as passive followers and ignorant of
Nazi crimes. 7 Reitlinger charged both contemporary and future German historians to deconstruct
this myth and not to allow the new German nation to avoid coming to terms with its recent
history.
Despite his crusade against historical silence, Alibi of a Nation does suffer from some
classic shortcomings: the entire narrative is told top down, focusing on the top leaders of the
Nazi hierarchy and rarely including an analysis of lower level members of the SS let alone
individual case studies; those who were committed Nazis are presented as members of the
middle class who chose the lesser of two evils (Nazism vs. Communism); and each department
of the SS is presented in a vacuum. Reitlinger stated that “the SD was fiercely independent even
7
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after being subsumed into the RSHA,” 8 which undermines the significance of the RSHA and its
ability to coordinate the various departments of the SS.
A decade later, German historian Heinz Höhne published his work Der Orden unter dem
Totenkopf, which, similar to Reitlinger, was a comprehensive history of the SS and its role in
Nazi crimes before and during the Second World War. Höhne devoted multiple chapters to an
analysis of the SD and SiPo and a number of key individuals, along with an entire chapter on the
RSHA, but these focused much more on their structural development and presented many
integral figures, with the exception of Eichmann, Heydrich, and Himmler, as passive
bureaucrats. At the heart of Höhne’s argument is an indictment of the petite bourgeois and upper
middle-classes, which, in his view, constituted the majority of SS membership. However, in both
his origins chapters of the SS and conclusion, Höhne presented a generational analysis of SS
men, something missing entirely from Reitlinger’s book. Höhne argued that men of a similar,
authoritative generational outlook contributed to creating an environment, in which the rule of
law was subverted to the rule of will. 9
Höhne was part of a new generation of historians who sought to distance themselves from
the previous ‘fascist generation.’ Most of Höhne’s arguments on what led to the Nazi
perpetration of crimes are structurally based, citing increasing radicalization through the SD,
SiPo and Gestapo as their authority and responsibilities increased in size and scope. Yet he
largely underestimated the significance of the RSHA, rendering it as mere tool of communication
between Heydrich and the various offices of the SD and SiPo, even claiming that its only

8
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physical existence was its printed acronym on every sheet of internal memorandums and
correspondence. 10
However, both Höhne and Reitlinger were at a disadvantage when they wrote their
respective works. The office building, which housed the RSHA in the center of Berlin was
completely destroyed by the end of the war and was paved over with the building of the Berlin
Wall in August of 1961. Its foundations would not be re-discovered until after reunification.
Hence, neither author had a precise physical location to associate with the RSHA. Cold war
divisions also hampered research, as a large portion of RSHA documents were sealed in archives
in East Berlin or Moscow, which forced both Reitlinger and Höhne to rely primarily on
testimonies from the defendants at Nuremburg, such as Otto Ohlendorf and Franz Six. There
were only a few individuals on trial who were former personnel of the RSHA and they
intentionally downplayed the importance and role of their office in perpetrating the Holocaust. 11
Although Höhne was writing when social history was first coming into existence in academia, he
and Reitlinger cannot be expected to have engaged in an approach that had not yet come to
fruition. It would be a later generation of historians and researchers who would write the first
comprehensive works on the RSHA and the generation of men who ran it.
Post-1990 Historians
Post-Cold War historians would not only have the benefit of access to more sources than
previous researchers, but also the advantage of technology. In September of 1999, an article

10
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published in the journal History and Computing titled “Analysing the Sociography of the
Membership of the Schutzstaffel in SS-Oberabschnitt Rhein” by Anne Becker and Detlef
Mühlberger presented evidence that further refuted the long-standing belief among historians
that the SS was purely a middle-class institution. According to a number of computer-based,
statistical models and using SS registration records from the Rheinland, Becker and Detlef
confirmed that around fifty percent of SS members before 1933 and forty-three percent after the
Nazi seizure of power came from working and lower-class backgrounds. 12 Yet these percentages
were not homogenously distributed. In terms of the SS leadership, it was almost entirely
comprised of individuals of middle and upper-class backgrounds, while SS-Death’s Head squads
in concentration camps were overwhelmingly working-class. 13 The RSHA men all came from
middle-class backgrounds, but it is important to reaffirm their socio-economic standing with this
new evidence in order to demonstrate how these seldom researched or mentioned individuals
were important and privileged leaders among the SS as well. At any rate, the SS, and the Nazi
Party as a whole, was represented by all socio-economic strata and such new findings would
greatly inform scholarship on the SS in the new millennium.
In 2003, Michael Wildt published his book An Uncompromising Generation: The Nazi
Leadership of the RSHA, which was one of the first (if not the first) analytical looks at RSHA
personnel from a combined generational and structural perspective. Wildt argued that the fourhundred men (and one woman) in leadership positions at the RSHA, unlike the rest of the SS,
were homogenous in background in terms of socio-economic status, education, and early
participation with the Nazi party and other völkisch groups, and that they were not passive

12
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Mitläufer, but the intellectual backbone of the Nazi party. 14 However, prior to the creation of the
RSHA in 1939, the efforts of these men were mostly in race, state, and racial-state theory. Only
through the creation of the RSHA were their efforts focused and theories put to practice, often
firsthand as leaders of Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in eastern Europe. Wildt based his
findings on twenty-nine individuals, most of whom had doctorates, published books and
scholarly journals throughout the NS-era, taught at universities, and were members of the SS.
More recently in 2013, Christian Ingrao published the English version of his book Believe
and Destroy: Intellectuals in the SS War Machine, originally published in 2010 in France, which
took Wildt’s method of a generational outlook and applied it to a much larger group sample of
eighty-four individuals. Although not researching too deeply into the structure of the RSHA,
Ingrao created a much clearer narrative of the experiences of this generation that separates them
from the older generation of Nazis, which included Hitler and others who had fought in the First
World War. While Wildt presented these individuals as more or less born psychopaths, Ingrao
convincingly incorporated the impact of the trauma of war and defeat, even though they had not
experienced combat, into the narrative of this generation as a historical and psychological
starting point for their path towards Nazi ideology. 15 Overall, Ingrao depicted this generation as
being in the best position to provide intellectual and ideological justification for genocide during
the Second World War. 16 They were true believers of Nazi ideology at the start of their careers,
did not require conversion, and provided a façade of academic integrity to Nazi policy and
authority, which made them a perfect fit for membership of the SS intellectual elite.

14
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Historical Background
The history of the generation of the RSHA is inextricably intertwined with the history
and development of the SS. Heinz Höhne described its earliest beginnings as such: “the history
of the SS begins where the chronicle of the National-Socialist movement is introduced; in the
tumult of post-1918 Germany.” 17 The Freikorps, especially the units that violently ousted the
workers commune in Munich in 1919, became a quasi-feeder program for the future SS. In
Munich elite groups known as Stosstrupp (strike force) or Stabswache (headquarters’ guard)
formed from former Freikorps fighters as essential bodyguard units for Adolf Hitler and his
entourage when they were in public. 18 The first Stabswache formed in March, 1923 when a few
“old fighters swore on their lives to protect Hitler from both external and internal enemies.” 19
In the weeks leading up to the Putsch of November 9, 1923, Hitler personally created a
new bodyguard group called Stosstrupp Hitler out of the former Stabswache and placed two men
in command, Joseph Berchtold and Julius Schreck. 20 It would be Schreck who was tasked with
forming Stosstruppen, which were renamed Schutzstaffel (protection squad) on April 4, 1925, in
every German city that could be organized upon Hitler’s arrival and each group typically
consisted of only ten men and one designated captain dressed in black to distinguish themselves
from the larger SA units. 21 Due to their small number, SS units were seldom noticed and dwarfed
by the much larger, louder, and more violent SA. The purpose of the SS would begin to change
drastically with the appointment of Heinrich Himmler as Reichsführer-SS on January 6, 1929.22
Himmler’s view on the future of the SS, as Reitlinger described, was that “all revolutions reach a

17
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stage when mob enthusiasm becomes too unwieldy and an inner bodyguard is called in to the
protection of the new state at the cost of some heads.” 23 Himmler began to consolidate his
position in Munich, Bavaria, and Germany as a whole through absorbing control of the local
police and undermining his main rival, Ernst Röhm and the SA. 24
By 1931, the ranks of the Nazi party were beginning to swell, but the threat of infiltration
grew as well, which would give Himmler the opportunity to weed out his rivals. The SS was by
no means the first to have a security service, as both the SA and the political Gauleiter had some
sort of information and surveillance squad. 25 Founded in 1931, The SD or security service was to
be Himmler’s way around a number of hurdles to the consolidation of his power. Himmler
placed a former Navy officer named Reinhard Heydrich, who had only marginal intelligence
experience, at its head, 26 but nevertheless was quick to adapt it to Himmler’s purposes.
Heydrich’s small SD had to out-compete the other Nazi intelligence services in spying on
enemies of the party (Zionists, Communists, etc.), while simultaneously spying on them as well.
By summer of 1932, the SD managed to outpace much of its competitors and Heydrich,
along with his deputy Werner Best, began recruiting young university graduates to ensure its
prominent position as the intelligence service of the Party. As a result of the Röhm purge in June
1934, the SS not only brought down its major rival, the SA, but also fully subsumed and
incorporated Göring’s Gestapo, giving the SS a full monopoly on German police and intelligence
services. 27 The rapid growth of the SD and the massive influx of security and police forces
necessitated the creation of the SS security police (Sipo) on June, 26 1936, which would also fall

23
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under Heydrich’s control, but friction would immediately begin to arise between the SD and
Sipo. 28 As both organizations were defined very loosely, there was a lot of overlap in tasks, and
often diverging interests between the two.
As international tension escalated by 1938 and war seemed imminent, Himmler and
Heydrich needed to increase cooperation and increase efficiency in both domestic and foreign
espionage and surveillance and to focus energy on weeding out not just political enemies, but
any racial or social ‘undesirable,’ for the creation of a racially pure state. Heydrich tasked
Werner Best and leader of the SD-Auslandamt (foreign office) Walter Schellenberg with drafting
plans for “the amalgamation of the police and intelligence services.” 29 Best’s plan called for total
amalgamation, while Schellenberg proposed keeping the offices separate, but in close
cooperation and within the same organization. Heydrich accepted Schellenberg’s plan and titled
the new creation the Reichssicherheitshauptamt or Reich Main Security Office, which was
officially created on September 27, 1939, nearly four weeks after the invasion of Poland. 30
It was no coincidence that the RSHA was created at the start of Hitler’s war against
Europe. Nazi Germany had commenced an arms buildup in the years leading up to September 1,
1939, and the creation of the RSHA was another necessary step in this process. The RSHA
consolidation created seven offices to manage the tasks of the Nazi state: organization of SS
personnel in SD and various police divisions (Office I), legal and administrative counsel (Office
II), analysis of the state of German domestic life (SD-domestic, Office III), enemy intelligence
(Gestapo-Office IV), crime fighting (Kripo-Office V), analysis of the state of foreign nations
(SD-Foreign, Office VI), and ideological research and collection of enemy ‘propaganda’

28
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(Library-Office VII). 31 These seven offices and their broadly assigned tasks within the
superstructure of the SS gave the RSHA unlimited authority both in Germany and the occupied
territories. In Germany, agents, spies, and other individual contacts were the eyes and ears of the
RSHA, but in the occupied territories, starting with Poland, the Wehrmacht and various SS
organizations, such as the Waffen SS and the Einsatzgrupppen, collected intelligence to be
reported back. 32 Every occupied territory had a few local offices of the SD or RSHA to facilitate
contact between Berlin and the front at all times.
The infamous Einsatzgruppen were also inventions of the RSHA. Handpicked from their
own staff and various police forces, these groups were in constant and direct contact with RSHA
headquarters in Berlin. 33 During the war, the RSHA could be seen as the Nazi brain trust,
formulating the plans of mass deportation, enslavement, terror, and murder to create a new racial,
European order. As the war turned against Germany and Berlin was subjected to constant
bombing, the RSHA ceased as a consolidated entity and operated out of a number of facilities
until war’s end. 34 The Einsatzgruppen and SS-Death’s Head units provided the grunt work and
gained infamy for their crimes, while many of those who orchestrated their operations remain
less known; only a few faced judgment at Nuremberg and most received brief prison sentences
and were released after only a few years. Some even offered their espionage services to the
Western allies for the coming Cold War and were never tried. 35

They remained secretly

committed to the ideology of National Socialism after the denazification trials until their deaths
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decades after the war. It was an ideology they helped to craft. The RSHA and its Einsatzgruppen
organizations provided opportunities for these architects to see their work in action and to take
part in activities that they considered not only historic, but a scientific necessity. This was the
work they had prepared for academically since they were students and psychologically since
their youth.
An Aspiring Generation
Of the three-thousand employees of the RSHA, four-hundred were leaders of varying
importance, but were nonetheless a rather homogenous group and shared relatively the same
level of culpability. As case studies representing various levels of leadership within the RSHA,
eight individuals will be the focus of this analysis: Reinhard Heydrich, Werner Best, Dr. Franz
Six, Otto Ohlendorf, Walter Schellenberg, Dr. Helmut Knochen, Erich Ehrlinger, and Emil
Augsburg. Heydrich, Best, Six, Ohlendorf, and Schellenberg represent the leadership of the
RSHA while Knochen, Ehrlinger, and Augsburg characterize those in more functional roles and
lower in the hierarchy. The eldest of this group, Best, was born in 1903 with Schellenberg,
Ehrlinger, and Knochen being the youngest, all born in 1910, which puts this group between the
ages of twenty-three and thirty in 1933 and thirty-five and forty-two in 1945. They grew up
during the First World War and the years of the Weimar Republic, but entered their professional
lives under the National Socialist regime. The men of this group shared many of the same
experiences, which makes them a rather uniform collection. They were all born to a middle-class
background and grew up in well-to-do neighborhoods. 36 The First World War, however, was
their first common experience, which affected them collectively. They and their families greeted
the war with “enthusiasm and a sense of determinism” in 1914. 37 “While this generation did not
36
37
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experience firsthand the physical violence and death and battle, the war was not a distant
occurrence in their lives.” 38 They and their families might have experienced war-euphoria in
1914, but later on in life, they only recounted the harshness of those years.
In his memoirs, published in 1956, Walter Schellenberg recounted his experience at war’s
end: “We lived in Saarbrücken, and when I was only seven, I had my first experience of an air
raid when the French bombed the town. The hard winter of that year, the hunger, the cold and the
misery, will always remain in my memory. The French occupied the Saar after the defeat of
1918, and our family business suffered.” 39 Many lost fathers to the conflict at a young age.
Werner Best was eleven when his father died in 1914.
My father’s heroic death threw me back on myself when I
was eleven. My mother collapsed and sought more support from
her sons…As a result I was brought up by the family tradition
rather than by the family itself…My father had left us a letter in
which he commended our mother to us and exhorted us to become
men, Germans and patriots…And from the age of fifteen, I felt
responsible for the new direction Germany should take. 40
For Best, Schellenberg, and the rest of their generation, the war had left an indelible mark. They
were not only traumatized by the realities of war, but also endured its defeat after being brought
up in the image of German, masculine strength. Their fathers were the masculine ideal: serving
the fatherland and dying heroically in combat. The idea that heroism and gallant death could be
rendered worthless after defeat was a real source of psychological trauma. As powerless
children, they saw their world crumble around them and they were determined to never allow
themselves or Germany to fall into such a state again, a goal they “shared uncompromisingly.” 41

38
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As teenagers and young adults, they attended universities, joined völkisch, student
organizations, and in some cases began to meet one another. They discovered others with similar
backgrounds and beliefs. Erich Ehrlinger attended the University of Tübingen in 1928 and
briefly left in 1930 to join the SA at the age of twenty. 42 In 1931, Ehrlinger returned to Tübingen
to finish his undergraduate studies in law, where he came in contact with another student activist,
and future RSHA member, named Martin Sandberger, who was a member of the
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (National Socialist German Students League)
or the NSDstB. 43 Another acquaintanceship formed in Heidelberg between Werner Best and
Franz Six. Best spent the immediate post-war years as an activist in the Rhineland, especially
during its occupation in 1923 when he was arrested, but subsequently released, by French
authorities. 44 Best finished his undergraduate and doctoral studies in law at Heidelberg as a
member of the Nationalsozialistischer Studentenbund (NSStB) by 1927. As a lecturer at the
university, he came into contact with Franz Six, also studying at Heidelberg and a member of the
NSStB. 45
The largest network of future RSHA men was in Leipzig, where Otto Ohlendorf, Emil
Augsburg, Helmut Knochen, and at least eight others attended university between 1928 and
1932. 46 The most prominent, right-wing student group in Leipzig was the Black Hand, which
was led by Heinz Gräfe, also a future member of the RSHA. 47 These various student
organizations often participated in rallies, conducted political and intellectual discussions on race
and law, promoted National Socialist ideology, and worked to exclude Jews and other ‘outsiders’
42
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from university life. They provided opportunities for these young men to make intellectual and
professional contacts with like-minded individuals. These organizations also provided a point of
departure for membership in the SS, but it would be their post-undergraduate, intellectual
pursuits that earned the attention of Heydrich and his newly formed SD.
What attracted the interest of Heydrich were clear demonstrations of intellectual status,
zeal, and ambition, as well as a pre-existing belief in Nazi dogma that did not require
indoctrination. Such was the case with Walter Schellenberg, who entered the SS in 1933 and did
not require indoctrination, as his first job was to do the indoctrinating. 48 Schellenberg received
his bachelor’s degree in law from the University of Bonn for the explicit purpose of eventually
“joining the foreign service,” but he first joined the SS and worked on its behalf as a lecturer,
pontificating on the corruption of the Catholic Church and the need for German law to be
founded in völkisch values. 49 It was after one of his lectures in spring 1934 that he would be
approached by two professors from the University of Bonn, who offered him a position, on
behalf of Heydrich, in the SD. Schellenberg joined immediately and worked his way into the
SD’s foreign office. 50
Another individual who entered in this same fashion was Emil Augsburg. From the
Leipzig network, Augsburg gained the attention of Heydrich’s recruiters for his knowledge of
and interest in the Soviet press and intelligence service. Augsburg was born in 1904 in Łódź,
then a part of the Russian empire, to a Volksdeutsch family and grew up speaking German,
Polish, and Russian. 51 His entry into the SD’s foreign office (and simultaneously the SS) in 1934
was essentially assured because of his knowledge of Russian and Polish and his doctoral thesis
48
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displayed his useful knowledge-base. 52 While writing his doctoral thesis The State and Political
Significance of the Soviet Press in its Historical Development, he spent ample time gaining
intimate knowledge of the Soviet press and Soviet propaganda, which made his services
indispensable for clear, ideological reasons. 53
Werner Best also entered the SS and SD in 1931 due to his intellectual pursuits. Having
entered the SS and SD earlier than most among this sample group, Best garnered not only
Heydrich’s interest, but also Himmler’s. His devout activism in the Rhineland along with his
doctoral work brought not only another intellectual zealot into the fold, but also helped to seal
the perception of the SS as an elite organization with connections to the best and brightest. Best’s
thesis, albeit a solid academic treatise on labor and employment law in Weimar Germany, was
appropriated by the SS to give it a positive association with academia. 54 Best simultaneously
entered the SD as Heydrich’s deputy and would play a critical role in establishing the ‘legal’
foundation for a secret, political police service, and administering the Gestapo after its
absorption into the SD. 55 Although committed to the völkisch principles of Nazi law, Best would
later fall out of favor with both Himmler and Heydrich because of his insistence that the SS was
not above the law of the state. 56 Nonetheless, for Schellenberg, Augsburg, Best, and the rest of
the new SS intelligentsia, the Nazi regime and particularly the SS offered opportunities to
become the elite of new society; one that they would help to build through their service to Volk
and Staat. As a cohort with a common source of trauma in the First World War, collective
radicalization during their formative years at University or as rank and file Nazis, and shared
beliefs and ambitions, they were to be the aspiring generation of the Third Reich.
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Service to the State: Illusion and Reality
The Illusion
Starting with their entrance to the SS, this intellectual elite was to give academic
credence to the Nazi state and to become the brain trust of National Socialist ideology. Despite
their positions within the SD, which were considered top secret, they still maintained
connections, or even held, positions at universities, and published a number of treatises in
academic or party-affiliated journals on various topics, such as economics, law, racial theory,
and history. 57 Some of it was legitimate academic work, such as Dr. Helmut Knochen’s
biography on the eighteenth-century British playwright George Colman titled Der Dramatiker
George Colman published in 1935, but was still appropriated by the Nazis for academic
legitimacy. Other works, such as Franz Six’ Freimauerei und Judenemanzipation (Freemasonry
and Jewish emancipation) published in 1938, were little more than racial propaganda with the
trimmings of proper historical work. 58 As Six’s work gave the Nazi regime and ideology the
appearance of academic support, Six, along with others, received prestigious positions at
universities. For instance, in 1938, at the age of twenty-seven, Six was granted a position not
only as a full professor, but also as dean of History and Philosophy at Berlin University. 59
Werner Best’s academic prestige also suited Nazi intentions. Although after the start of
the war, he published in 1940 a two-hundred fifty page book titled The Administration in Poland
before and after the collapse of the Polish Republic, which, adding insult to injury, was a
deliberate attempt to rewrite Polish history from a perspective of racial determinism after
Poland’s swift defeat. The first two lines of this less-than-objective historiography states, “The
national history of a people is always crucial in determining the state-building and state57
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maintaining abilities of its people, as well as determining in this history how many of these
abilities are formed from outside influences. An overview of the state history of Poland compels
one to form a negative verdict of the state-building and state-maintaining abilities of this
nation.” 60 Best clearly wanted to create a narrative supporting the new, European order, where
the dominant German ruled over the weaker Slavs not just in the present moment, but throughout
history.
Although lacking the academic credentials of most of the men who worked for him,
Heydrich also published work throughout the pre-war era. In 1936, he distributed a brochure
through the party-affiliated publisher Franz Eher Nachfolger GmbH titled Wandlungen unseres
Kampfes, which argued “that the struggle against [Jewish Bolshevism] has grown deeper than
ever; a struggle that must no longer be fought with normal means… but by having its roots
ripped from the ground.” 61 In the same year, Heydrich also published an article titled Die
Bekämpfung der Staatsfeinde in the prominent journal Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft (German
Jurisprudence), which essentially argued the same point as the aforementioned article. 62 Material
published in a journal generally reserved for scholarly articles on law gave Nazi race theory the
appearance of academic support, further symbolizing not only the subversion of law, but of
academia as well. However, for the men of the RSHA, this was only a cover for their real work
in the SS.
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The Reality
Prior to the start of the Second World War and the creation of the RSHA, the primary
objectives of the men of the SD were to observe and report sources of opposition to the Nazi
Reich. For example, during the winter of 1939, the SD-Inland issued a number of reports on the
content and distribution of a book titled Die Grundlagen des jüdischen Volkes: eine notwendige
Abrechung mit dem Judentum. 63 Published in Breslau (Wrocław, Poland today) by Pötsch
Verlag in December 1938, Die Grundlagen was a last ditch effort by German author Walter
Pötsch to express his outrage at the treatment of Jewish Germans and to rally support against the
regime in response to the pogroms of Kristallnacht. 64 He wrote,
thousands have been bloodily beaten, brutally tortured, thrown in
to concentrations camps, and mistreated; doctors, business-men,
workers of all backgrounds, people like us! …German People! The
voices of conscience, of humanity, of heart, of reason, and the
voice of your fate are calling out to you! 65
His impassioned call to action unfortunately only attracted the attention of those who wished to
silence him. A report by the SD-Inland in January, 1939 issued to the SiPo described the book as
merely “dealing with the Jewish question in Germany and the reprisals against the Jews in a Jewfavoring fashion” and recommended “protective custody” for Walter Pötsch as a necessary
action. 66 The fate of Walter Pötsch is unclear, but his attempt to appeal to the righteous
indignation of the German people was quashed in swift and calculating fashion by the SD. All
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copies of the book that could be located were confiscated and Pötsch Verlag was closed
immediately. 67
While the ‘Pötsch Case’ is an example of the SD’s role as an intelligence-gathering and
decision-making entity, its members could also, when willing, take on roles that placed them in
the front lines of fighting the enemies of the Reich. Dr. Franz Six, among others of the SD, was
one with such a penchant for direct action. On January 25, 1938, Dr. Six vaguely reported back
to SD headquarters in Berlin from the East Prussian city of Königsberg that the intelligence
services of Danzig and Poland “have been damaged.” 68 Eight days later, Erich Ehrlinger, a leader
within SD-Inland Berlin at the time, forwards a report to the SD director of East Prussia,
providing an overview of the event a week prior in Königsberg:
During his stay in Königsberg, Dr. Six, working on behalf of the
SD, took command of local security forces and led an ‘action’
against the ‘National Zionist Union,’ during which the intelligence
services of Poland and Danzig were damaged…the ‘action’
occurred in response to the materials being sent across borders into
Poland by the Zionists…the materials are being treated as evidence
of the connection between the national Zionists and the [Polish]
NZO (New Zionists’ Organization) and have been delivered to the
necessary divisions…The operation is considered a success as the
leader of the Zionists in Königsberg has been arrested, although it
cannot be ascertained, how much damage this has caused the
[Polish] intelligence service in Danzig. 69
The language of the order is intentionally vague, as is often the case with Nazi documents and
details about the nature of the ‘action’ are lost, but what can be gleaned from this series of
communications reveals more about those who wrote them than their actual topics. For one,
despite Six’ comfy, tenured position at the University of Berlin and high rank in the SS and SD,
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he was more than willing to engage in direct action against the enemies of the Reich; not just
organize from an office in Berlin, but also lead cleansing operations in the streets.
However, both this ‘action’ and the suppression of the Pötsch book were examples of
early activities for the men of the SD that involved subverting possible sources of resistance and
opposition within the German Reich. These operations largely targeted individuals and resulted
in arrests and deportations to concentration camps, but during the invasion of the Soviet Union,
the RSHA targeted broad swaths of populations for extermination based on Nazi conceptions of
racial inferiority. A radical shift in policy was made possible through a world war and an
adaptive administration. Only a few months after the suppression of the Pötsch Verlag, the
Second World War commenced with the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and the SD
would be combined with the SiPo to form the more efficient, flexible, and murderous Reich
Main Security Office.
The Creation of the RSHA
In 1937, Heinrich Himmler described the purpose of the SD and SiPo as destined “to
protect the German people as a total organic being, its life force, and its institutions, from
destruction and decay.” 70 Additionally, when Reinhard Heydrich expressed the wish to forge a
new SS and police organization out of the SD and the SiPo and gave the task of designing it to
Walter Schllenberg and Werner Best, his key phrase to guide them was “a fighting
administration.” 71 Heydrich imagined that,
the RSHA was supposed to unite political initiative, analysis of
issues,
organizational
responsibilities,
and
practical
implementation into a single institution that would be regulated by
no administrative or legal norms but instead would be capable of
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acting as a political organization everywhere and with any means
deemed politically necessary. 72
This radical transformation of the SD and SiPo from compartmentalized organizations into an
all-encompassing bureaucracy large enough to administer all Nazi-occupied lands at the height
of the Second World War, yet nimble enough to adapt to specific and changing tasks, radicalized
the men of the RSHA from racial theorists and Nazi intellectuals to calculating executioners. A
transformation their experiences made possible.
However, a detailed history of the RSHA, even for its brief, five-year existence, is an
exhaustive study in bureaucratic jargon, groups and subgroups appearing then disappearing, and
individuals shifting between offices, from the office to the field, and vise-versa. What can be
gleaned from this minutia-riddled assemblage, however, is that the RSHA was not overblown
and inefficient, but nimble, dynamic, and able to adapt. “It was capable of expanding or
shrinking, building new departments and dissolving old ones, shifting priorities or establishing
new ones, and initiating intra-agency task forces.” 73 For example, when the RSHA was first
organized on Septermber 27, 1939, it contained six offices, but Franz Six organized a seventh
office titled “Ideological Research and Evaluation,” which would become a crucial office for
two, specific war aims: the physical and racial assault on Europe. 74
Six, however, was often detached to “Office II Organization, Administration, Law” or
attached to a command of a Einsatzkommando throughout the war. Office VII, with and without
Six, however, played a major role in the intellectual theft of Europe by the Nazis. Office VII was
often known as the “Library of the RSHA” and during the war it amassed a voluminous
collection of books, treatises, and other academic works by Jewish intellectuals in order “to build
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a case for a Jewish conspiracy against the state and legitimize the expulsion and extermination of
the Jews.” 75 A pre-requisite to be a member of this office was to at least have an undergraduate
degree and six of the twelve of the section heads had earned their PhDs. 76 The sources for their
‘research’ were all looted from private and public libraries, synagogues, and Yeshivas across
Europe. 77 Following the invasion of Poland, after being transported in six train cars, 500,000
volumes arrived at the new Library, but this number increased, by some estimates, to threemillion by the end of 1941, with the addition of Marxist and Freemason literature. 78
Another critical office of the RSHA was “Office III German-life-areas,” or the former
SD-Inland office. Otto Ohlendorf and Emil Augsburg were both assigned to it, with the former
as Office head and the latter as a group leader, who also worked extensively with “Office VI
Foreign Affairs.” Both were later sent east in 1941 as Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando
leaders. 79 Interestingly, the German word for the title of Office III was Lebensgebiet, which one
could directly define as ‘life domain,’ but the definition this carried in the RSHA was much more
encompassing, even revolutionary. Testifying at Nuremberg after the war, Ohlendorf tried to
define the term for the tribunal:
It’s very difficult to define, as it includes a whole world of ideas.
Let’s take the ‘domain of law, for example. We need to imagine
that the life of the law includes all its institutions and their effects
on the normal course of life. In our groups, we have always
expressed the opinion that culture was wider than what is usually
understood by this term, in other words that it includes all the
manifestations of the life of a people. This means culture in the
narrow sense, just like areas that are distant from it, such as
economics, which are then included. This must not just include the
superficial, but the whole human environment that springs from it.
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Thus for us, public health, law administration, economics, the
sciences, education, and religious life all composed the ‘life
domain.’ 80
From this definition, one can get a sense that Office III was the very organization Himmler
explained in the quote from 1937. It was this turgidly named office that, during the war years and
afterwards, given a Nazi victory, would control and monitor every aspect of the Volk:
Gleichschaltung brought to its full potential. During the war, the Office was especially useful for
gauging actual public opinion of the war effort, but this function ceased after 1943 for fear of the
demoralizing effect of the collected data. 81 The formation of this Office was the pet-project of
Ohlendorf, who only put off further development in order to command Einsatzgruppe D and
‘cleanse’ the continent of the biological enemies of the Volk: a pre-requisite, in his estimation,
for the flourishing of the Volk as masters of Europe. 82
The largest office of the RSHA and the one that employed three of the individuals
focused on in this study was “Office VI Foreign Affairs,” which contained forty-three subsections at its height due to, as one may imagine, the vast amount of land under Nazi occupation
and the fact Germany was eventually at war with three, major allied powers. 83 The three who
worked in Office VI, for the most part, were Walter Schellenberg, Emil Augsburg, and Dr.
Helmut Knochen. When Office VI was established, it was intended to form the groundwork for
administering the occupied territories and conducting counter-espionage, which often put it into
close cooperation with “Office IV Investigating and Combating Opponents” (The Gestapo
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Office). 84 It was in Office IV, specifically Group IV E specializing in counter-espionage, where
Walter Schellenberg started his work with the RSHA. 85
According to Schellenberg’s recollection, it was on June 22, 1941, the day of the invasion
of the Soviet Union, that he was appointed head of Office VI for the sole purpose of turning the
office into “a more unified intelligence service” and using his connections with the Gestapo to
foster closer cooperation between these two offices. 86 Evidence of close cooperation between
these offices, although dated to 1939, before Schellenberg became chief of Office VI, comes in
the form of a series of internal, RSHA memoranda between Dr. Helmut Knochen, the second
individual of Office VI, and Adolf Eichmann of “Office IV Group B4: Emigration and
Evacuation” a sub-group that specialized in orchestrating the mass deportations of Jews and
other ‘enemies of the state.’ In one communication, Dr. Knochen provides a recommendation for
an individual named Paul Schmitz to work in Eichmann’s office in a “position specializing in
transport capacity.” 87 Eichmann, considered to be one of architects of the Holocaust, apparently
required specialized assistance and Office VI offered support where needed.
The third individual of this study in Office VI was Emil Augsburg, who was assigned
early in the history of the RSHA to “Group C Eastern European Affairs.” Augsburg, because of
his specialties, would see little time behind a desk in Berlin and much more in the killing fields
of eastern Europe. He and many other officials of the RSHA were making this transition from
intellectual to Schreibtischtäter or Täter. The RSHA was radical in that it created an apparatus
where intelligent, although clearly anti-Semitic, individuals, who would have otherwise pursued
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solely careers in academia or civil service, became perpetrators both indirectly of mass murder
and directly. The Einsatzgruppen, the creations of the RSHA, provided the opportunity for
legalized, and in their view, justified violence and genocide. The operations of the
Einsatzgruppen, most of whose leaders were members of the RSHA, “were far more horrible
than the acts of terror that had been committed by the same men in their earlier positions as
Gestapo and SD leaders.” 88
The Einsatzgruppen
The first experiences at genocide for the men of the RSHAcame during the invasion of
Poland, as this proved to be the testing ground for policies later in the war. 89 In the weeks
leading up to the invasion, Heydrich and a number of his top SD officials, which included
Werner Best, Franz Six, Erich Ehrlinger, and Helmut Knochen, organized, outfitted, and
assembled five Einsatzgruppen in the cities of Allenstein, Breslau, Dramburg-Pommern, Oppeln,
and Vienna, which served as their launching points into Poland. 90 “The members of the
Einsatzgruppen were drawn primarily from the SS and police stations of the areas surrounding
the respective assembly points,” but the leaders of the larger Einsatzgruppen and the smaller,
more nimble Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos were chosen from among the leadership
in the SiPo, SD, and among Heydrich’s group as well. Ehrlinger, for example, joined the staff of
Einsatzgruppe IV. 91
The objective of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland was rearguard work: clearing potential
‘combatants’ in Polish cities and towns behind the advance of the Wehrmacht. However, who the
Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos determined to be combatants was left to their discretion. In a
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consolidated field report from Einsatzgruppen III and IV on September 6, 1939, the two units
were sweeping the towns of Kempen and Konitz, respectively, and encountered sporadic
resistance from “armed militia.” 92 This was used as a pretense to broaden their definitions of
combatants and act accordingly. In Kempen, one-hundred “criminals” and fifty Jews were taken
into “protective custody.” 93 The report does not suggest that they were executed, at least not
immediately, but during the six-week operation of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland, 10,000 people
were executed. This, however, pales in comparison to the slaughter that occurred during the
invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, when the men of the RSHA were not just organizers,
but active participants of mass-murder. 94
From June 22 to the end of December, 1941, the four Einsatzgruppen collectively killed
approximately 550,000 people at a rate of execution fifty-five times higher than that in Poland
and the men of the RSHA were some of the most fanatical in the bloodshed. 95 However, unlike
in Poland where there was daily correspondence between Berlin and the Einsatzgruppen, orders
from the RSHA were less frequent and were often broad and discretionary, leaving the
organization of Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos and how the executions were to be
performed in the field up to individual commanders. 96 Otto Ohlendorf, commander of
Einsatzgruppe D, which was assigned to the Ukraine, stacked his command with not just RSHA
men, but personnel from his own office, which made his command much more personally
attuned. 97 In a six-day period, from August 23 to August 29, 1941, Ohlendorf’s command, which
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included Romanian auxiliary troops, executed approximately 4,300 Jews in the region
surrounding Ananyev in the Ukraine. 98
Operating in the Ukraine later in the war was Erich Ehrlinger, who, while stationed in
Kiev as commander of SD forces, demonstrated his efficient method of murder in numerous
cases. Ehrlinger, unlike Ohlendorf, was often present at execution pits and was known to
encourage his command with motivational speeches before executions. He even personally shot
men, women, and children to set an example of killing without remorse or zeal. 99 Before his
appointment in Kiev, Ehrlinger’s efficiency caught the attention of his superiors when he was
commander of Einsatzkommando 1b in Latvia during the summer of 1941. From July 7 to July
16, Ehrlinger and his seventy-man command “executed 1,150 Jews” near the town of Daugavpils
and encouraged all in his command to “equally participate.” 100
However, in one infamous instance in the summer of 1943 near the small town of
Michalowa just outside of Kiev, Ehrlinger broke from his usual detached and efficient methods.
After a successful escape of five Jewish prisoners from his custody, Ehrlinger ordered the entire,
local Jewish population of the ghetto to assemble in the square where he asked them all to start to
count off. The approximate five-hundred Jews did not immediately follow his orders and began
to murmur amongst themselves in a perceived show of defiance. In response, Ehrlinger,
reportedly angry and screaming incoherently, drew his pistol and discharged two, full magazines
of ammunition into the crowd at random and without discretion, killing and wounding many. 101
The former Tübingen University graduate of law was now killing not because of ideology or
orders, but for the sake of killing. His zeal for slaughter made his superiors reluctant to relocate
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him. Ehrlinger did not leave his position until he was promoted to the head of Office III of the
RSHA in 1944, making him the longest serving ‘field specialist’ of the RSHA. 102
For Ehrlinger, the transformation had reached its radical conclusion, but others, perhaps
more horrifyingly, maintained their calculating composure during the long months of massacre.
During what many hoped to be the final push towards Moscow in the fall of 1941, Dr. Franz Six
left his positions at the RSHA and at Berlin University to take part in intelligence work in
Smolensk. Six, in cooperation with other SD officers, “captured and identified key, political
commissars for interrogation, torture, and execution.” 103 Six was slated to lead the first
Einsatzkommando into Moscow as soon as the city fell in order to seize the prized documents of
the Kremlin. 104 Also a part of this taskforce was Emil Augsburg, but, unlike Six, he had more
extensive experience on the Eastern Front with Soviet prisoners. Since June, 1941, Augsburg had
been in command of Einsatzkommando Moskau, which specialized in swiftly interrogating and
executing dozens of Soviet officers throughout the summer and was slated to be the first task
force to enter the Soviet capital. 105 During a Soviet air attack in Smolensk, Augsburg was
wounded and sent back to Berlin, where he, due to his ideologically sensitive work in the east,
continued his work with the RSHA until the end of the war. 106
To the Bitter End
Despite the academic and ideological ardor of Augsburg, Ehrlinger, Ohlendorf, Six, and
the rest of the RSHA leadership, Moscow did not fall. Rather, Nazi-occupied Europe fell after a
string of military defeats, and the new, European order that they devoted their lives and careers
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to creating crumbled before their eyes. But even for these academics, denial of the situation was
a powerful anesthesia. They continued their work researching, publishing, and killing for the
Nazi Reich to the bitter end. The evidence for such fanatical denial lies in the publications and
speeches of these individuals during the war years, with Dr. Franz Six being the most vocal of
the SS intelligentsia. In January 1944, despite the already deteriorated military situation, Six
published an article titled “The Transformation of the European State System to the World State
System” in the journal Zeitschrift für Politik that focused on the Nazis’ view for Europe’s future
as a united continent leading the world. He argued that “Germany, in this current conflict, is
fighting for the western-European cultural community, for the ascension, through a common,
European Lebensraum, of the new European order to the position of a world-power…and against
the Anglo-Saxon powers, who would willingly place ideological world-hegemony in the hands
of their bolshevist partner.” 107 Six, like the rest of the SS intelligentsia, believed in the bright
future of their new world order and wanted to promote its ascendancy, no matter the reality. A
year later in March of 1945, when Nazi Germany’s destruction was imminent, Six published one
last article titled Europe in Question: The Crisis of the European Spirit, but with more of an
urgent and apocalyptic tone. He still brazenly urged all of Europe to resist occupation and to “not
let what took centuries to create be destroyed in mere months, weeks, days, or even hours; to
consider the results of the First World War as just a small example of the substantial loses, both
physical spiritual, and intellectual, in store for Europe.” 108
Even before the destructive year of 1945, The RSHA had already abandoned its central
office, due to the constant, allied bombing campaigns, and distributed its various sub-sections
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throughout Germany, which decreased effective communication and cooperation, and created, in
certain areas, bureaucratic fiefdoms. 109 With the perceived, mortal enemy of National-Socialism,
Jewish-Bolshevism, on Germany’s doorstep, an atmosphere of simultaneous anxiety and
contempt for the enemy, one that had been fostered since the start of the war, reached a fever
pitch, which pushed them further to the conviction of fighting to the bitter end. 110 For example,
in the last months of the war, the Swiss and Swedish red-cross attempted to negotiate with the SS
for the release of prisoners from concentration camps to receive proper aid. 111 Only in the last
weeks of April, 1945, did Sweden secure the release of Scandinavian prisoners, but Switzerland
still received a cold rejection, further proof of the stubbornness and callousness exhibited by
many of these men, even at war’s end. 112 The RSHA, with its original central office in Berlin
being reduced to rubble by February 1945, finally ceased to exist on April, 23 1945, when its
leaders finally realized the end had come and went into hiding. 113

Conclusion
On December 17, 1941, while giving a speech in Prague on the need for closer
cooperation between Germany and southeastern Europe in the “struggle against international,
Jewish bolshevism,” Reinhard Heydrich ended his speech with the pledge, “to the prosperity of a
greater Germany and to the prosperity of a new Europe.” 114 Four years later, with Europe in
shambles, tens of millions killed, wounded, or displaced, the irony of such a statement could
have not been stronger. The former leaders and intelligentsia of the SS were no longer the
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founders of a new world order, but war criminals in a defeated and occupied Germany. The SS
and its nexus of organized and intellectual terror, the RSHA, were to have brought the Nazi
racial state and its vision of Europe into existence, but failed. It is sometimes assumed that Nazi
war criminals were nothing more than the dregs of society, typical ‘Brown-Shirt’ thugs, who
manipulated their way to the top and came from criminal backgrounds. Yet, for the large part,
this was not the case.
As Michael Wildt noted, “this

project [the RSHA] led

droves

of

intellectuals,

academics and scientists to become ready supporters of the Nazi regime. At last,
philosophers could believe that they were in power; physicians could see themselves in
the role of uncontrolled designers of human life; historians could think themselves in a
position to shape world history.” 115 They were not just racial, anti-Semitic theorists, sitting in
the proverbial ivory tower, dreaming and ranting among their fellow cohorts about the necessity
of a homogenous and strong Volk. They joined, organized, and commanded the organizations
that made theory and ideology a reality. Along with their educated and middle class upbringing,
their experiences as a generation prepared them for radicalization. Their experiences as children
of the First World War, as völkisch activists in their youth, and as young, Nazi intellectuals,
making connections at universities and other academic settings, helped solidify their theories and
made them into true believers. Yet, it was the nature of the RSHA as a radicalizing and allencompassing entity that created opportunities to not only focus their energies, but to commit
acts they otherwise would never have thought themselves capable of perpetrating.
Epilogue: Did They Escape Justice?
Of the eight individuals used in this study to give a glimpse into this ‘RSHA Generation,’
seven survived the war. All seven went into hiding, but could not remain out of sight for long.
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250,000 former Nazis were detained by the occupational forces, but the overwhelming majority
of this group received light sentences, considering the nature of their crimes, or nothing at all,
with only the top, few leaders in the regime receiving the harshest of sentences. With only a few
exceptions, such as Otto Ohlendorf, most of the men of the RSHA generation re-entered German
society with little to no hindrance. 116 Some became business-men, advertising executives, or
worked for the booming automobile industry. Franz Six was released in 1951 after only serving
five years in prison and worked as an advertising executive for Porsche until his death in 1975.
But where does this leave the question of guilt for the men of this generation? Did they largely
escape justice? If so, what does this say about Germany after the Holocaust? Shortly after the
end of the National Socialist regime, the memory of the RSHA was both figuratively and literally
buried under cold war divisions. The Berlin Wall was built over the remains of the RSHA in the
center of Berlin and divided Germany, both east and west, sought to suppress the crimes of their
nation or conveniently place all the blame on a few dead men such as Hitler, Himmler, and
Goebbels. The crimes of the Third Reich are bigger than any one person or any handful of
perpetrators; they were crimes only an entire nation is capable of committing. Ehrlinger should
have been executed or sentenced to life in prison for the 1,150 lives he and his command had
executed in Latvia. Perhaps all 250,000 detained Nazis should have been removed from German
society through imprisonment, expulsion, or execution, but Germany’s guilt would have
remained nonetheless. The Nazi regime did not come to power through a coup led by a radical
minority, but was chosen by the German people.
In the 1960s, the first generation of post-war, West Germans confronted this history by
asking the older generation, “What did you do during the war?” A few high ranking Nazis were
put on trial, but most were simply identified and never prosecuted, much like the men of the
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RSHA. This process of identifying and making publically known how many former Nazis were
still a part of West German society was a first and difficult step in coming to terms with the
nation’s past. Following reunification with East Germany and the fall of the Berlin wall, the
process of coming to terms with the past gained momentum in the unified state as citizens
revisited questions of national identity. Open dialogues on national guilt, German identity, and
the building of memorials in Berlin symbolized progress made. As Germany peeled back the
layers of its historical conscience, researchers rediscovered the physical remains of the RSHA
beneath the Cold-War layer of Berlin’s history. The foundation blocks of the RSHA are currently
on display as a part of the free exhibit Die Topographie des Terrors, displaying not only the
structural architecture of a totalitarian state, but also the names and faces of its architects.
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Appendix 1A: Glossary of Personnel 117

Reinhard Heydrich: Born on March 7, 1904 in Halle, Germany.
Came from a middle class family; Father ran the local, music conservatory and raised his
children to be musicians. Heydrich excelled at piano and violin.
Joined a Freikorps in March 1919 at the age of 15, and a civil defense formation the
following year.
Entered the German Navy in 1922 to pursue a career as an officer.
Joined Himmler’s fledging SS in 1931 as his deputy and head of the SD
Made Chief of the SD and SiPo on June 26, 1936
Chief of the RSHA on September 27, 1939
Died on June 4, 1942 following and assassination attempt in Prague.
Emil Augsburg: Born in Łódź in 1904 to a middle class, Volksdeutsch family
- Raised to speak German, Polish, and Russia
- Attended the University of Leipzig to study law and worked as an editor for its publishing
house.
- Earned his PhD in 1934, which focused on the Soviet Press, and entered the SD-Ausland the
same year.
- Entered the RSHA as part of Office VII Research division (the library).
- Given command of Sonderkommando Moskau : specialized in the liquidation of Soviet
Officers
- Worked for the American OSS and CIC (Counter-Intelligence Committee) from 1946-1948
as a specialist on Soviet intelligence; never put on trial.
- Believed to have died in 1981
Werner Best: Born July 10, 1903 in Darmstadt, Germany to a middle class family
Arrested during the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 for subversive activity, but was
later released.
Attended Heidelberg University for both Undergraduate and Doctoral studies in law: He
wrote his thesis in 1927 on European Tariff law.
Joined the SS and SD in 1931 as Heydrich’s Deputy
As Chief of SD forces in Denmark in 1942, he tried to implement the final solution with
little result due to the resistance of the Danish People.
Werner Best was never tried in Germany, but did testify on behalf of Six and Ohlendorf
during the Nuremburg trials. Best always asserted his role as ‘legal advisor’ and that he
never knew of the mass killings, but thought the Jews were being expelled eastward.
Investigations by West German Authorities in the sixties suggested that he had a much larger
role as an organizer, who provided völkisch legal justification for mass murder, but Best was
considered to be in too poor of health to stand trial, and lived in Germany until 1989.
Erich Ehrlinger: Born October 10, 1910 in Baden-Württemberg to a middle class family
Entered the University of Tübigen in 1928 to study law, but briefly left to join the SA in
1930. Returned to finish his studies in 1932.
Left his career in law to join the SS in 1935 and was selected for service in the SD.
Gained experience as a Sonderkommando leader in the Sudentenland and Austria.
Given command of Sonderkommando 1b and is held responsible for 1,150 executions in
Latvia, and hundreds more in the Ukraine.
Promoted to head of Office III of the RSHA in 1944.
He went into hiding under an assumed name after the war, but was denounced by his ex-wife
in 1952. Not arrested until 1958, he was sentenced in 1961 to twelve years in prison for
1,045 counts of being an ‘accomplice to murder,’ but only served four. He died in 2004 in
Karlsruhe, Germany.
Source: Public Domain
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Helmut Knochen: Born on March 14, 1910 in Magdeburg, Germany to a middle class family
Studied German, English, and Physical Education at Leipzig from 1930-34.
Joined the Nazi party in 1932 and completed his dissertation in 1935 at Göttingen University
on the English dramatist, George Coleman. Brought into the SS and SD by Franz Six in 1936.
Appointed chief of SD and SiPo forces in Paris in June, 1940. He was responsible for the
implementation of the final solution in Paris and then all of occupied France in 1942 (was a
part of Office VI SD-Ausland of the RSHA)
In 1946, Knochen was sentenced to death for ordering the execution of a British paratrooper,
but was then extradited to France where he was also sentenced to death in 1954. His sentence
was commuted to life-imprisonment in 1958, but given amnesty in 1962, where he returned
to Germany and worked as an insurance salesman.
He died in 2003.

Otto Ohlendorf:Born February 7, 1907in Söhlde, Germany to a middle class family
Joined the Nazi Party in 1925 and the SS in 1926, before even Himmler.
Studied economics at the University of Leipzig from 1928 to 1932.
Earned his Doctorate in law in 1936; the same year he joined the SD.
Head of Office III SD-Inland at the RSHA’s inception
Appointed head of Einsatzgruppen D in the Ukraine for much of the war.
Ohlendorf was tried at Nuremburg and he, like most of the defendants, tried to argue for his
innocence, based on that the fact that he was only following orders. The tribunal did not find
it convincing and found him responsible for the deaths of 90,000.
Ohlendorf was executed by Hanging on June 8, 1951: the only one to be executed of this
group.

Walter Schellenberg: Born January 16, 1910 in Saarbrücken, Germany to a middle class family
Studied Law at the University of Bonn; joined the SS in 1933 and was recruited for the SD in
1934.
Became a specialist in counter-espionage in the SD-Ausland and was made chief of Office VI
SD-Ausland of the RSHA on June 22, 1941.
Fancying himself a ‘James Bond,’ type of spy, Schellenberg travelled across Europe and
Africa, taking part in numerous espionage-related projects.
Although recognized by a military tribunal as being fully aware and even contributing to the
mistreatment and mass murder of Soviet POWs, he was only sentenced to six years in prison
and served only two, after being released early for poor health.
He died of Liver cancer in 1952 after completing his memoirs in Italy.
Source: Public Domain

Franz Six: Born August 12, 1909 in Mannheim, Germany to a middle class family.
Studied philosophy and history at the University of Heidelberg from 1929 to 1934,
completing both his undergraduate and doctoral studies.
Joined the Nazi Party in 1930 and the SA in 1932.
He was a member of the NSStB during his studies in Heidelberg, where he met Werner Best,
who was influential in his recruitment to the SS and SD in 1935.
He was Professor of History at Berlin University, chief of Office VII Ideological Research,
and later of Office II Administration and Law at the RSHA during the War years.
Involved in various SD operations before and during the War, Six only received a twentyyear sentence due to a lack of evidence directly linking him to the killings; evidence that
would resurface later in the form of testimonies from other perpetrators in his unit. His
sentence was twenty-years in prison, but was released in 1951 after only serving five years,
and worked the rest of his life as an advertising executive for Porche until his death in 1975.
Source: Public Domain
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Appendix 1B: Glossary of Terms
SS: Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad) - An elite corps of the Nazi Regime led by Heinrich
Himmler after 1929.
SA: Sturmabteilung (Assault division) - An essential private army of the Nazis used heavily in
street battles during their rise to power and led by Ernst Röhm; subsumed into the SS after the
Night of the Long Knives and the assassination of Ernst Röhm.
SD: Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) - Formed in 1931 by Reinhard Heydrich at the behest of
Himmler to form an elite, intelligence gathering service.
SiPo: Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) - Formed in 1936 by Himmler and placed under the
leadership of Heydrich, it contained the infamous Gestapo (Secret Police) and the KriPo
(Criminal Police).
RSHA: Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office) - Created on September 27,
1939, it was an amalgamation of the offices of the SD and SiPo, as well as creating few new
offices as well. It was vital for the close coordination, cooperation, and necessary planning for
units, such as the Einsatzgruppen, and the implementation of the Final Solution later in the war.
Ausland: Abroad or foreign
Einsatzgruppe (Task force): An invention of the RSHA and whose members were recruited from
the SiPo and SD, these units were integral to carrying out operations of high ideological
importance, especially on the eastern front, such as the execution of ideological enemies (Jews,
Soviet Officers, Partisans, etc.) and securing vital documents from foreign archives. There were
four during the Invasion of the Soviet Union: Einsatzgruppe A, B, C, and D.
Einsatzkommando and Sonderkommando (Operations unit and special unit): Both were
subdivisions within a larger Einsatzgruppe and are essentially interchangeable. They refer to the
same size task forces, which perform the same tasks. It was up to commander’s discretion as to
which term was used.
Freikorps: Paramilitary groups formed in Germany during the chaotic months after the End of
the First World War to suppress communist forces. Although supporting the creation of the
Weimar Republic, they were often politically aligned to the far-right.
Gauleiter: Regional leaders of the Nazi party in Germany
Gleichschaltung (Coordination): Nazi policy of ‘coordinating’ all aspects of German Society
with Nazi ideology; it was successful to varying degrees.
Inland: Interior or domestic.

39

Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass): A nation-wide Pogrom against its Jewish citizens,
organized by the Nazi Regime that occurred November 7-9, 1938.
Machtergreifung (Seizure of Power): Term used to refer to the Nazi seizure of Power on January
30, 1933.
Mitläufer (fellow travelers): Term used to refer to those in Nazi Germany who went along with
Nazi policies and made no effort to resist.
NSDstB: Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (National Socialist German Students
League) - A nation-wide, Nazi Student organization founded in 1926.
NSStB: Nationalsozialistischer Studentenbund (National Socialist Students League) – A Nazi
Student organization specific to Heidelberg University; also founded in 1926.
Schreibtischtäter: Literally, ‘desk criminal.’
Staat: State
Stabswache: Headquarters‘ guard
Stosstrupp: Strike force.
Täter: Perpetrator, culprit, or criminal
Volk (A people or nation): Within the context of this study, the term refers to the Nazi ideal of a
racially, ideological ‘healthy,’ German nation.
völkisch (ethnic/ national): An adjective describing ideas or actions that fit within Nazi
conceptions of the German ethnicity or nation.
Volksdeutsch (Ethnic German): Refers to ethnic Germans living outside of German speaking
lands.
Wannsee Institute: An organization founded in 1937 in Wannsee, a suburb of Berlin that
specialized in surveillance, research, and analysis of the Soviet Unioin.
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Appendix 2B: Chart of the RSHA
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